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The capacity for re- description
Alberto Corsín Jiménez
When Velázquez took to painting The Spinners in c.1657 he had been 
court painter in the service of King Philip IV for over thirty years. 
Details of Velázquez’s persona and biography are elusive and mysterious. 
Compared to his contemporaries, his oeuvre is scarce, perhaps because he 
attended only to royal commissions. In this sense, a great deal of his time 
as royal painter was spent, for instance, curating the royal art collection. 
In such a capacity he ‘had responsibility for interior design and decoration 
–  placing mirrors, statues, tapestries, and paintings in many rooms, in 
many royal dwellings, and at the temporary destinations of important 
royal journeys’ (Alpers 2005: 183). His role as a collector of art has often 
been commented upon when noting how fellow artists –  Manet, Picasso 
–  have coincided in describing him as ‘the painters’ painter’. He made of 
the royal art collection and museum his studio, and his art displays this 
encompassing of art as technique, narrative, history and ambience. His 
art self- traps itself in both its aesthetic and environmental designs: ‘we 
might imagine Velázquez’, writes Svetlana Alpers of his courtly persona, 
‘as coolly making his way and his paintings while he is caught up (trapped, 
perhaps) in the Habsburg court’ (Alpers 2005: 162).
Velázquez’s work, however, is by no means subdued to courtly 
interests, as anyone who has ever approached his paintings can attest 
to. Velázquez’s art resists comprehension; it places all sorts of frictions 
and tensions between the artwork and the spectator. Maybe Velázquez 
was trapped in the Habsburg court, but he surely managed to trap the 
court and its courtiers in his paintings too. For Alpers, who follows 
Ortega y Gasset in this respect (1987), Velázquez’s strategic entrap-
ment of himself and his work within courtly politics and affairs evi-
denced his being ‘admirable in his detachment, a “genius in the matter 
of disdain”’, for whom ‘[s]ingularity is valued  … not as the exercise of 
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freedom, but as a resistance to coercion’ (Alpers 2005: 162, emphasis 
added). Velázquez’s art functioned thus both as a trap of and a trap for 
an ecology of meaning, and it is in this capacity for ‘double encompass-
ment’ (Wagner 2001: 63) that it afforded a sense of self- detachment for 
himself. Velázquez succeeded in creating a habitat or environment for 
his work that enabled his staging a dialogue between the things repre-
sented inside a painting and the choreographic displays with which he 
furnished the royal dwellings. He found a place for himself in painting 
that was at once inside and outside the canvas. 
In this chapter I would like to explore some of the consequences that 
derive from this reading of Velázquez’s political and charismatic detach-
ment as an effect of his ‘entrapment’ in the presentations and represen-
tations of courtly life. Velázquez paints courtly life and lives a courtly 
existence, and his art attempts to capture this recursive displacement in 
and out of each. We may say that his is an attempt at making ‘recursion’ 
itself visible as an aesthetic form and technique. The notion of recur-
sion is an important one that I return to later. For the time being, let 
me note that in Velázquez’s case, this requires, on his part, the design 
of an environment (a pictorial language, a praxis of interior decoration) 
with which he furnishes and inhabits the interface between the inside 
and the outside of a canvas. This interface is an emerging and nebulous 
space, rarely explored before. Drawing from the pictorial resources 
employed in the description of insides and the ornamental means with 
which outsides have traditionally been furnished, Velázquez suddenly 
realises that he may actually be giving shape to an embryonic capacity for 
re- description.
I am interested in these re- descriptive exercises, in how they are rendered 
visible, and what their effects are. The forms of re- descriptions are impor-
tant. Some rejoice in their spatiality. They come, we might say, with envi-
ronments attached. Such is the case with Velázquez, whose work operates 
as a trap of sorts: a trap that draws you into the pictures and simultane-
ously draws the pictures out into the world. A trap that environmentalises 
relations. We see this in more detail in the first part of the chapter, where 
I return to The Spinners and describe some of the very original techniques 
through which Velázquez invented and introduced aesthetic forms of sus-
pension, displacement and detachment into his work.1
An argument I want to put forward is that the work of environmen-
talising relations –  the work of environing the hyphen that holds the ‘re’ 
and the ‘description’ together, so to speak –  is worth paying attention to. 
Today the capacity for re- description seems to have been pre- empted by 
an economy of information that places a premium on self- description: 
descriptions that move by themselves, such as in cybernetic feed-
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back mechanisms where information is recursively enriched and self- 
enhanced. ‘Recursion’ itself has in fact become a common analytical 
trope in social theory of late, and in the second part of the chapter I look 
at recent transformations in higher education, including developments 
in the political and aesthetic economy of information, to cast some 
light on the types of environments that these recursions are effecting. If 
Velázquez found a singular place for himself in courtly affairs through 
an aesthetics of resistance, it would seem that the politics of information 
today works through an aesthetics of irresistibility.
The chapter concludes with some observations about what it may 
mean to think of ‘detachment’, about how to inhabit the hyphen, in 
these our epistemic times: what traps we may need to deploy to move in 
and out of description as a critical form. The text as a whole may be read 
in this spirit too, as a modest attempt to essay some of these contrap-
tions, where ‘detachment’ is presented not just as an object of analysis, 
but also as a style of argumentation.
The Spinners
Velázquez’s painting is a complex and highly sophisticated representa-
tion of the myth of Minerva and Arachne.2 Ovid’s fable of Arachne 
in the Metamorphoses (Book VI, I) is the story of a young girl who 
challenges the accusation that her great skill as a weaver is owed to 
the goddess Minerva. Goddess and girl thus enter into a competition 
to prove their respective skills. Minerva soon realises that Arachne’s 
weaving skills are superior and takes offence at the latter’s weaving into 
her tapestry of an image of the infidelity of the goddess’s father, Zeus. 
The goddess then reprises by famously turning the girl into a spider. The 
weaver, in other words, spins herself.
The Spinners, however, offers no straightforward representation of 
Ovid’s fable. It provides a stark counterpoint to previous treatments of 
the theme, mostly of an allegorical nature, for example Ruben’s Minerva 
and Arachne, which was very well known to Velázquez, to the extent that 
he copies it in Las Meninas, on the far wall just above his (Velázquez’s) 
own head. But while Velázquez gestures and acknowledges previous 
takes on the Ovidian story, his pictorial solution is very different.
There are three planes to The Spinners. Upfront we encounter a group 
of five women in a workshop: a woman spinning a wheel, one carding 
comb and the other three variously assisting the spinners. The back-
ground space is itself layered into two, with a theatrical representation 
of Arachne’s fable taking front stage, and a tapestry of Titian’s Rape of 
Europa (a painting then in the Spanish royal collection) in the back. As 
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is so often with Velázquez, the painting looks unfinished: it employs eco-
nomical, casual brushstrokes to display a sense of fleetingness and move-
ment, blurring faces and hands, or simply avoiding them, by turning 
heads away or hiding body parts. Velázquez emulates here Titian’s inno-
vative sprezzatura brushwork (from disprezzo, disrespect or disdain; 
Alpers 2005: 156), to whom he in fact pays homage in the background 
tapestry. Moreover, this way of handling painting, Alpers has observed, 
allows Velázquez to blur, not just specific motifs or objects, but ‘repre-
sentation’ as an aesthetic strategy more amply:
the manner of handling paint is sustained in depicting objects at a very dif-
ferent scale. It is not, to use a term of our times, fractal. Threads of white 
paint hanging from the large foreground winding- skein are painted with 
the same strokes that highlight and structure the smaller blue gown farther 
back. The same quick, economical brush strokes that constitute aspects of 
large things closer by also describe the small figure farther away. (Alpers 
2005: 138–146)
This disrespect for scale and clarity is also extended to his representation 
of social status and standing. Mythical beings (Minerva and Arachne) 
Figure 1 The Spinners, Diego Velázquez, c.1657
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are pushed into the back of the painting as women of lower rank are 
placed up front. The stuff of myth (allegory and representation) is back-
grounded while the everyday (manual labouring) takes front stage. As 
Alpers puts it more generally, ‘It is not that he [Velázquez] erases or 
reverses distinctions, but that he frees pictorial representation from any 
simple relating of size and importance’ (Alpers 2005: 178).
I noted above that among Velázquez’s duties as courtly painter was 
taking responsibility for curating the royal collection. This included 
assisting with the display of the royal household’s collection of tapes-
tries, one of the greatest in the world. Velázquez himself never designed 
a tapestry, but it could be argued –  and Alpers has persuasively done so 
–  that perhaps he conceived of The Spinners as a commentary on, and 
a homage to, the traditions and authors that he cultivated as a painter 
and curator.
The seventeenth- century painting culture in which Velázquez was 
trained encouraged and rewarded copying. Students learned by copying 
the masters; artists competed to participate in the lucrative business of 
copying religious prints for sale in the New World; and patrons were 
keen to pay for replicas of great paintings, in particular those in the 
royal collection (Alpers 2005: 190–192). ‘The aura of a work might 
be increased, not decreased, by copying it’ (Alpers 2005: 193). In this 
context, it is not unimaginable to think of Velázquez as aiming to locate 
himself within this painting culture, and doing so by painting his own 
collection of copies, his own gallery. Unlike the tradition of collectors’ 
cabinets paintings, however, where a painting reproduced the canoni-
cal system of images wherein it hoped for inclusion,3 The Spinners 
establishes a conversation about the very nature of painting. Thus, here 
Velázquez stages a conversation on the art and craft of making images 
with the masters that inspired him –  Titians and Rubens, among others 
–  and whose works he came to know and appreciate not just as an artist 
but as a collector too:
This room [the workshop represented in The Spinners] is not depicted with 
paintings hanging on the walls and life going on it. Instead, paintings are 
brought to life and they are brought together. Uncertainties result: are the 
figures of Minerva and Arachne in front of or part of the tapestry? what is 
the relationship of the foreground women to painted myth? The recollec-
tion of paintings that were in the palace collection –  of Rubens, of Titian, 
of Tintoretto, of Jan Bruegel and more –  is appended to a myth and to 
the practice of making. Art not as a matter of copying, or of imitating, 
but as re- creating. In Las Meninas, Velázquez depicts himself at work in 
the studio/museum. In The Spinners, he is imagining the experience of it. 
(Alpers 2005: 218)
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With The Spinners, then, Velázquez plays off invention and conven-
tion inside a painting. He introduces spatial, temporal and narrative 
displacements that superpose and perturb cultural registers ordinarily 
kept separate, such as those of myth, theatrical performance, allegory, 
copying, museum collecting, tapestry or manual labour. He is not so 
much offering a description (a representation) of how these practices 
and activities take shape in the world as cracking open the terms 
through which they mutually describe each other in this seventeenth- 
century world. His is an attempt at showing how descriptions re- 
describe themselves.
The art of description …
As noted, little is known of Velázquez the painter. His life is well 
documented, although historians remain relatively in the dark as to 
his personal vision and artistic project. His place in courtly affairs has 
left trails in administrative records and registers but little in the shape 
of biographical references or personal recollections. In the absence of 
such evidence it is, of course, moot to ask what may have motivated 
or shaped his outlook and sensibility. There is considerable consensus 
among historians that a driving- force in Velázquez’s life was his ambi-
tion to obtain aristocratic recognition and status. His appointment as 
royal painter was of course a favourable step in this direction, but it 
also meant that he was left with less time for painting, for in this role 
he had to assume responsibility for the interior decoration of the royal 
household. Some historians have seen in this a source of internal con-
flict, between his vocation as a painter and his aspirations as courtier, 
between the artist and the aristocrat (Brown 1986).
Not being an art historian I will not dare to take sides in this debate. 
But I do wish to pause on the terms through which Velázquez seems to 
elaborate upon this very distinction –  between painter and courtier– in 
The Spinners. We have seen that in this work Velázquez rejoices, not 
in the separation of offices or roles, but in the art of description, in the 
effects of mutual describabilities. He displays a deep commitment to 
exploring and generating the pictorial conditions that allow for ‘descrip-
tion’ itself to assume different registers and forms, and to move to dif-
ferent effects, inside the painting. ‘The ability to constantly re- describe 
something from another viewpoint’, writes Marilyn Strathern, ‘produces 
a displacement effect of a particular kind’ (Strathern 1992: 73). She calls 
this effect ‘merography’, a typically modern cultural resource where 
‘[p]erspectives themselves are created in the redescriptions’ (Strathern 
1992: 73).
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Although it is an intrepid claim to make, perhaps, in The Spinners, 
Velázquez was experimenting with this embryonic seventeenth- century 
cultural resource: what descriptive and aesthetic register, he might 
have challenged himself to think, might this emerging capacity for re- 
description assume? What kind of perspective may Velázquez have been 
attempting to extricate through this novel and exciting technique?
We can offer some tentative answers: no doubt that of an outstanding 
artist, the painters’ painter, as he came to be known –  of course, that of 
a noble courtier too, his long- standing aspiration. Yet perhaps he was 
aiming for a middle third also: the perspective of re- description itself, a 
Baroque in- between that places the person and her world in suspension, 
and that struggles to make this suspension –  this recursion between aes-
thetic, political and biographical forms –  visible. Not adjudication and 
resolution –  now painter, now courtier –  but re- description. A middle 
third capable of trapping the proliferative and wondrous capacities of 
description as a trapping interface itself.
… and the art of separation
The story of Velázquez’s entrapment between his royal duties and 
his artistic vocation came to mind when reading a recent account by 
Marilyn Strathern on the changes in the expectations of academic office 
in UK universities over the past twenty years. The focus of her account 
is, in her own words, ‘the detachment of the William Wyse Professorship 
[WWP] from the headship of the Department [of Social Anthropology 
in Cambridge]’ (Strathern 2009: 127, emphasis added). When the 
head of department and the holder of the foundation chair coincided, 
‘there was a performative requirement made of the office- holder as the 
Professor’ (Strathern 2009: 130). The university was evident, we might 
say, through the professor, in her investments towards the advancement 
of knowledge and her defence of the university’s interests. Come the 
audit turn of the 1990s, however, and the person and the office part 
ways. ‘The person’, writes Strathern, ‘becomes personalised. The WWP 
becomes less of an office’ (Strathern 2009: 130). The office disappears 
from view and it is the individual intellectual –  the intellectual as an 
individual –  that gains full display.
Strathern’s account draws on Paul du Gay’s critique of the ‘ethics of 
enthusiasm’ that held sway across public sector management in the UK 
during the turn of the century (du Gay 2000, 2008). Enthused by a moral 
economy of participatory empowerment and creative management, the 
new gurus of third- way public administration called forth the abandon-
ment of dusted principles of rule- bound bureaucratic  organisation and 
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formalistic impersonality. The aim was to shake the state loose from its 
unbending formalities and inflect a new entrepreneurial and communi-
cative spirit to the state bureaux.
Du Gay develops this analysis by setting in contrast Max Weber’s 
famous account of bureaucratic organisation with the new ethics of 
enthusiasm. Despite caricatures to the contrary, Weber’s model of 
bureaucracy in fact stressed the levelling and democratic impulses inher-
ent in the procedural impartiality of bureaucratic administration. As 
Weber himself put it: ‘Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass 
democracy’, which results from the ‘abstract regularity of the execution 
of authority’ (Gerth and Mills 1946: 224). The procedural abstraction 
of impersonality abducts a society of equals from day- to- day interac-
tions. No matter who you are or where you come from, the bureaucratic 
machinery will make all people conform into homogeneous administra-
tive categories. The work of the civil service, then, may be mirrored 
to Archimedean levers. In its formalisation of vocation as a statutory 
professional goal, the bureaucrat enacts an ethic of organisational- cum- 
social democracy. 
Not vocation but enthusiasm, empathy and care is what the new turn 
in public administration calls for. Under the auspices of ‘responsive’ 
government, the civil servant is to be reconfigured as ‘something akin 
to an enthusiastic, energetic and entrepreneurial “yes- person”’ (du Gay 
2008: 343). The yes person, however, is likely to irradiate affection and 
commitment well beyond his constitutional and official mandate: ‘office 
and self become blurred, with committed champions coming to see the 
office as an extension of themselves’ (2008: 345). This, then, is a person 
who encounters no circumscription or delimitation to its attachments. 
She lets go of the office in lieu of new annexations. As Strathern had 
it, the office disappears –  it gets detached from the person –  but a new 
person appears in its stead: an enthusiastic individual keen on extending 
his or her constituency, on embracing new connections, on articulating 
novel annexations. An individual that grows on attachments.
The detachment of person and office, du Gay tells us following politi-
cal theorist Michael Walzer, is an instance of the ‘art of separation’ that 
lies at the heart of liberalism (Walzer 1984). For Walzer, the craft of 
liberal politics consists in the institution of walls between social domains 
previously entangled. With each new wall a new liberty is instituted. 
Thus, the line drawn between church and state instituted a sphere of reli-
gious activity where men were allowed to exercise freedom of religious 
conscience. As for the rise of office as a corporate identity distinct from 
dynastic, familial or personal interests, the art of separation worked 
thus: ‘the line that marks off political and social position from familial 
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property creates the sphere of office and then the freedom to compete for 
bureaucratic and professional place, to lay claim to a vocation, apply for 
an appointment  … The notion of one’s life as one’s project probably has 
its origin here’ (Walzer 1984, 316–317). 
Interfaces
Walzer observes that the separation of person and office marked a point 
of inflection in the history of political liberalism. His focus is on the reor-
ganisation of a series of categories of political thought: religious con-
science, privacy, property, office, even life itself. These were gradually 
and historically separated out into the building blocks and fundamental 
constituents of freedom.
I am intrigued by Walzer’s resort to the image of the ‘wall’ as the 
technology of separation: ‘Liberalism is a world of walls’, he wrote, 
‘and each one creates a new liberty’ (Walzer 1984: 315). Walls are a 
brake to rumour- mongering and conspiratorial politics. They help keep 
ghosts at bay. But walls may also be used for display and decoration. 
As we saw in the case of Velázquez’s duties as curator, the walls of the 
royal household became centrepieces of his labours. Moreover, as his-
torians Jonathan Brown and Svetlana Alpers have shown us, Velázquez 
sacrificed a good deal of his vocation –  ‘the notion of one’s life as one’s 
project’, as Walzer puts it –  on those walls. Velázquez took up the chal-
lenge of decorating the palace’s walls, with tapestries, sculptures and 
paintings, in corridors and galleries, as a project in the art of description 
rather than separation. In this sense, walls may be said to behave more 
like thresholds or media interfaces than barricades.
Velázquez’s experimentation with decoration and description as an 
interface effect makes sense when seen in the larger context of Baroque 
society, for a concern with theatrics, illusionism or the sublimation of 
form were indeed characteristic of Baroque aesthetics. Baroque society 
was in many respects the first media society. The first articulated expres-
sion of a theory of media was produced in the context of Baroque 
political work, and every theory of media since has been, in practice, a 
theory of the extensiveness and reach of Baroque effects (Corsín Jiménez 
2013: 7–11). The use of ‘techniques of incompleteness’, such as trompe 
l’oeil or anamorphosis, or the phenomenal explosion in the use of stage 
machinery in theatrical representations, all contributed to a dramaturgi-
cal conception of social life (Maravall 1986).4
Take for example Thomas Hobbes’s famous theatrical representation 
of sovereignty and political organisation. According to Noel Malcolm, 
Hobbes’s famous imago of a sovereign body holding in its interior, and 
YARROW PRINT.indd   187 30/04/2015   14:44
188 Detaching and situating knowledge
pacifying the designs of, a chaotic multitude may have been inspired by 
an encounter with a dioptric anamorphic device designed by the French 
Minim friar Jean- François Nicéron (Malcolm 2002). Nicéron’s design 
involved a picture of the faces of twelve Ottoman sultans which, on 
looking through the viewing- glass tube, converged into the portrait of 
Louis XIII (Malcolm 2002: 213). In Malcolm’s account, the anamorphic 
lens’s capacity to effect a transformation of relations, from multifarious 
and chaotic to unitary and orderly, would have seduced Hobbes’s into 
imagining a similar iconographic representation for the title page of his 
book. We could say, therefore, that for Hobbes the lens generated the 
perspective –  the capacity for re- description –  from which knowledge 
of the political surfaced. That most modern of epistemes, ‘the political’, 
emerged therefore as an interface- effect: politics is what the world looks 
like from the point of view of the lens.
I have brought up Hobbes’s political theatrics at this stage –  the 
interface- mechanics of his politics –  because it is to the Hobbesian 
theory of sovereignty that Paul du Gay turns to after rehearsing a 
genealogical study of enthusiasm. He traces the use of the term to the 
period of religious civil wars in seventeenth century England. Back 
then, Enthusiasts were members of a fanatical religious sect who in 
the name of an ‘Enthysiasmical’ revelation claimed privileged access 
to divine inspiration and, therefore, an unmediated access to truth (du 
Gay 2008: 347). As is well known, Hobbes had tremendous contempt 
for such expressions of religious fervour. His Leviathan was a supreme 
effort to annihilate all manifestations of religious enthusiasm. For Simon 
Schaffer, who has commented on the dioptric (anamorphic) effect of 
the Leviathan’s parallax artifice, the capacity to ‘see double’ (to see the 
twelve sultans and Louis XIII in duplex perspective) became in fact a 
first step in the ultimate sublimation of sovereignty as hegemonic vision. 
In seventeenth- century politics this was easily accomplished because 
outside the rule of sovereign law, as Hobbes noted, lay only a chaotic 
state of nature, shaped by suspicion, fear, witchcraft accusations and 
the mischievous play of invisible phantoms. The rise of Leviathan exter-
minated the invisible, neatly aligning, in a supreme gesture of political 
illusionism, the planes of the natural and the phantasmagorical (Schaffer 
2005: 202).
Let me recapitulate the interface- effect. The Hobbesian lens allowed 
for the imagination of sovereignty as an autonomous and self- sufficient 
political organon. It allowed Hobbes to cancel Enthusiasm, but it did so 
by cancelling or hiding the very artificial design that made the cancella-
tion possible. Not unlike Walzer’s use of walls, Hobbes opted to look 
through, and over, the lens rather than with it. His interest in the effects 
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of Baroque media lay not in the genre of its resistances and disturbances 
(the dioptric refractions) but in the irresistibility of its political pro-
gramme. Having jumped over the wall, and left the Enthusiasts behind, 
the Hobbesian person turned his or her attention to the task of ‘extend-
ing his or her constituency, on embracing new connections, on articulat-
ing novel annexations’, as I put it above. An individual that grows on 
attachments and appropriations. A yes person.5
Recursions
I have borrowed the notion of the interface- effect from software and 
cultural theorist Alexander Galloway (2012). Galloway’s is a very sug-
gestive take on software, and the structure of digital data and informa-
tion in particular, because of his efforts at re- situating the latter in the 
terrain of allegory and symbolism rather than virtuality and technology. 
Although Galloway does not trace the interface effects of present- day 
media technologies back to the Baroque, his description of what inter-
faces accomplish may, I believe, sustain this link:
Digital media are exceptionally good at artifice and often the challenge 
comes in maintaining the distinction between edge and center, a distinc-
tion that threatens to collapse at any point like a house of cards. […] The 
interface is this state of “being on the boundary.” It is that moment where 
one significant material is understood as distinct from another significant 
material. In other words, an interface is not a thing, an interface is always 
an effect. (Galloway 2012: 33, emphasis added)
The moment when a ‘material is understood as distinct from another 
significant material’ –  the moment when a material detaches itself from 
itself –  is of course a moment of re- description. Galloway is particularly 
interested in how this inter- phasing is accomplished by digital media 
today; how the digital becomes the hyphen, in the terms I used earlier. 
Our failure to pay attention to this middling effect of media, notes 
Galloway, reflects the poverty of our critical and conceptual imagina-
tion, which appears inexorably bootstrapped to the digital aesthetics of 
networked and informational capitalism. Software’s self- executability 
(the fact that computer programmes run on their own and do things) 
conceals the fact that it is at heart a symbolic operation. It expresses 
almost to perfection the idea of a ‘symbol that stands for itself’ (Wagner 
1986), the symbol that self- eclipses its symbolic provenance:
Such is the fundamental contradiction: what you see is not what you get. 
Software is the medium that is not a medium. Information interfaces are 
always ‘unworkable.’ Code is never viewed as it is. Instead code must be 
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compiled, interpreted, parsed, and otherwise driven into hiding by still 
larger globs of code. Hence the principle of obfuscation. But at the same 
time it is the exceedingly high degree of declarative reflexivity in software 
that allows it to operate so effectively as source or algorithmic essence –  the 
stating of variables at the outset, the declarations of methods, all before the 
real ‘language’ takes place –  within a larger software environment always 
already predestined to parse and execute it. And hence the principle of 
reflection. (Galloway 2012: 69)
Information interfaces thus accomplish the trick of proffering re- 
descriptions that do not look as such. Re- descriptions without a form! 
Such apparently formless descriptions –  self- descriptions, or descriptions 
that stand for themselves –  have in fact long been the object of anthro-
pological analysis. Thus, for example, Roy Wagner famously glossed the 
capacity of symbols to simultaneously produce obfuscation and reflec-
tion as ‘obviation’: the meaning and relations that are made ‘obvious’ by 
a symbol are one of many that have thenceforth also been ‘obviated’ (e.g. 
Wagner 1978). Obviation therefore ‘executes’ a recursive movement, 
such that the object of a description offers itself up for re- apperception 
in a future description. Such a descriptive move becomes a trope for/of 
perception (Wagner 1986: 33).
I have suggested above that it was this ‘for/of’ divisor that Velázquez 
may have been surprised to discover inside the ‘cárcel dorada’, the 
golden prison, of his museum walls (Alpers 2005: 180), and which he 
spent much of his life interrogating and exploring: how to divide the 
divisor itself, how to trap it and express it in an aesthetic register and 
form. Velázquez’s pictorial solution to the trap was a form of ‘environ-
mentalisation’: an exercise in interior decoration where the capacity 
for re- description made room (sometimes quite literally) for allegorical, 
symbolic, ornamental, material and even theatrical dispositions.
If Galloway’s and du Gay’s diagnoses of the political and aesthetic 
economy of information are anything to go by, however, it would seem 
that the enthusiastic self- executability of information is today leaving no 
room for re- descriptions. So how can social theory ‘occupy’ and make 
room for the nondescript again?
In this context it is perhaps no coincidence that ‘recursion’ has become 
a favoured analytical strategy in contemporary social theory. Thus, for 
example, Chris Kelty speaks of free software engineers’ self- grounding 
of their collaborative efforts –  by virtue of writing and coding the 
communicative infrastructure that supports their exchanges –  as the 
construction of a ‘recursive public’ (Kelty 2008). Exploring the cult of 
Ifá divination in Cuba, Martin Holbraad likewise resorts to the idiom 
of ‘recursion’ to explain how the inventive definitions –  the ‘infini-
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tions’ (Holbraad 2012: 220) –  of the truth- regimes through which Ifá 
practitioners describe their predicaments must inevitably re- inscribe the 
truthfulness of anthropological description too. And Sarah Franklin has 
recently advocated a similar recursive route for anthropological analysis, 
taking inspiration in the way human development is modelled in vitro 
in stem cell labs (Franklin 2013). Modelling ‘man’ in vitro researchers 
are afforded the possibility of holding a description of anthropos in 
suspension, a possibility that opens up in turn the conceptual space for 
encountering and designing new diagnostic tools.
These moments of infrastructuring, infinition and suspension are rem-
iniscent of Velázquez’s re- descriptive exercises, as I have presented them 
here. They dwell on the culture of invention fuelling every description. 
Yet I wish to pause for a minute on this inventive moment, on the trope 
of cultural resourcefulness and prefiguration, figuration ahead of time, 
that these analytical sensibilities announce and incorporate.
Whereas for Velázquez recursion was an effect of his re- descriptive 
perambulations, the aesthetic of his encounter with the environments 
of mutual describabilities, it would seem that the status of recursion in 
contemporary social theory is that of a methodology instead: recursion 
as something we should do to or look for in descriptions, rather than 
something that descriptions do to us.6 Now it is not my intention to 
produce a typology of recursions, let alone a normative classification of 
recursive usages, but I do think it is worth briefly laying out some of the 
epistemic components of this methodological strand.
The forefather of the methodological use of recursion in social theory 
was, of course, Gregory Bateson, who borrowed the epistemics of 
recursion from cybernetics. In particular, he was drawn to cybernetics’ 
conception of information as a feedback system for the way it enabled 
him to think of the future and the possible as self- looping environments 
(Harries- Jones 1995). We experience a therapeutic sense of freedom, 
Bateson argued, when we sift through information that is layered recur-
sively. In so doing we correspondingly undergo a transformation from 
self- to ecological consciousness. Recursion does not come with environ-
ments attached, but if properly executed all the way through, it releases 
the environment as consciousness.
I am interested in this therapeutic dimension of information, its status 
as a symbol that may liberate or restrain cathartic energies, for this 
understanding of information as an on/off releaser of energy is not how 
cybernetics was first conceptualised in the 1940s. As Peter Galison has 
shown, cybernetics emerged from Norbert Wiener and his associates’ 
wartime effort at engineering servomechanisms capable of predicting 
an enemy aircraft pilot’s actions (Galison 1994). The blurring of the 
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human- machine (pilot- weapon) interface in the name of an information 
loop was modelled on the ontology of an enemy, an enemy that was not 
defined negatively as other than ourselves, but mysteriously as an infor-
mational black box:
the cybernetic Other is not negatively contrasted with us, nor are we the 
model upon which the Other is empathetically formed; our understanding 
of the cybernetic Enemy Other becomes the basis on which we understand 
ourselves. […] It is an image of human relations thoroughly grounded in 
the design and manufacture of wartime servomechanisms and extended, in 
the ultimate generalization, to a universe of black- box monads. (Galison 
1994: 264–265)
The fundamental problem for cybernetics, then, was not the ontol-
ogy of the Other, nor the nature of our relation to them, but the 
Other as instruction, a recursive function for perpetual self- modelling. 
Description as executability. Thus the premium that cybernetics placed 
in defining information as structurally irresistible: an object whose 
density overcomes every matter of resistance, friction or detachment. 
Information must be free! Its flow uninterrupted, yes, yes, yes all the 
way through.
Re- enter the ‘yes person’, for whom the office was ‘an extension of 
themselves’, as du Gay put it (du Gay 2008: 345). The extension, we 
know now, is informational: the cultural obsession that yes persons 
evince in their demands for ever more information –  information that 
loops around itself, in the name of audit and transparency –  is there-
fore simply a reflection of their ontological self- formation as replicable 
beings (beings that aim for the replication of themselves in and through 
information):
the image of self- replicators such as computer viruses is breathtaking in its 
own way. No environment appears necessary when what is at issue is the 
replication of communication devices themselves. It is as though genes did 
not need to be embodied: what is reproduced is simply the informational 
capacity itself. Models with a life of their own! (Strathern 1992: 169, 
emphasis added)
‘No environment appears necessary’ because recursion is indeed its own 
model, its own method. Because it is self- delivered (data- streamed) in its 
transformation from self- to ecological consciousness. In this context, 
then, perhaps the lessons to be drawn from Velázquez’s Spinners involve 
imagining what it may mean to speak from a cultural episteme where 
information does not exist, whose modernity is Baroque rather than 
anti- , non- or post- , and where the aesthetic sources of suspension and 
YARROW PRINT.indd   192 30/04/2015   14:44
The capacity for re- description 193
infinition have to be trapped rather than invented. When the capacity for 
re- description aims for environing its own hyphen.
Coda
One of reasons why the humanities have received vigorous criticism 
from quarters concerned with their social and media impact refers to 
the use they make of unpalatable, opaque, unreadable jargon. How can 
writings that claim social provenance, the critics argue, stand in no rela-
tion of transparency whatsoever to the publics they refer to? Why do 
some academics insist on making information resistible?
In a wonderful essay that takes issue with such criticism, Michael 
Warner has exposed some of the underlying assumptions that equate 
clarity with political and popular engagement, and has profiled in 
turn how an intellectual public may in fact work (Warner 2005). For 
a start, notes Warner, we miss the point of intellectual engagement if 
we think social or critical commentary should have immediate effect. 
Those ‘who write [so- called] opaque left theory might very well feel 
that they are  … writing to a public that does not yet exist, and finding 
that their language can circulate only in channels hostile to it, they write 
in a manner designed to be a placeholder for a future public’ (Warner 
2005: 130). The channels that mediate the relationship between an 
intellectual and its publics are not simply communicative, nor are they 
coeval to the writing process. We have come to think of the public as a 
‘socially expansive audience’ to which public intellectuals must relate to 
‘in horizontal terms’ (Warner 2005: 144); an over- enthusiastic crowd 
hooraying our theoretical exegeses. Yet remember: all enthusiasms end 
up calling forth an art of separation. We might do better distinguish-
ing, then, between the temporality of politics and the temporality of 
critical and world- making projects. The latter mobilises an orientation 
to strangeness and long- term risk that is not to be found in the former 
(Warner 2005: 150, 158). An orientation, in a sense, that looks for and 
engages in a deliberate play of baroque displacements or enhancements: 
postponing completion, exercising estrangement, trapping descriptions. 
Environmentalising relations.
Let me finish with Weber. In an age of disenchantment, Weber found 
in the vocational call an ethical escape from the determinism of technical 
accomplishment and the frenzy of enthusiasm. Vocation poised itself in 
an ethical space at a complex historical moment, when the production 
of knowledge was being reconfigured by the rise of individualism and 
rational self- interest. A hundred years later, the one has caused ‘voca-
tion to lapse into dilettantism, the other to harden into professionalism’. 
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The person and the office, the artist and the courtier, the scholar and the 
administrator parting ways. This is why political theorist Sheldon Wolin 
has suggested that to ‘survive, the idea of vocation might have to be 
revoked and replaced by the sobrieties of method or invoked: Invocation 
as vocation’s conscience recalling it to the cross- grained’ (Wolin 2000: 
6).
In –  vocation: to summon and extricate –  to detach –  new voices, new 
descriptions. An environment for another hyphen.
Notes
1 Velázquez was in fact participating in a larger Baroque epistemology that discov-
ered the trick of holding forms and effects in mutual suspension (Corsín Jiménez 
2013): for example, the Shakespearian trick of writing a play into a play, or the 
pictorial techniques of trompe l’oeil or anamorphosis, where paintings self- efface 
a part (or the entirety) of their representational motifs. The play and the trompe 
l’oeil work as descriptions that detach themselves from themselves yet retain 
descriptive integrity: aesthetic forms and effects through which the detachment of 
detachment –  a capacity no doubt for re- description –  is accomplished.
2 What follows is a close reading of Svetlana Alper’s magisterial interpretation of 
Velázquez’s work (Alpers 2005).
3 For example, William van Haecht’s The Gallery of Cornelis van de Geest 
(c.1628).
4 It is worth noting that the Baroque remains tightly anchored in the episteme of 
modernity. Thus, art historian Martin Jay has distinguished three ‘scopic regimes 
of modernity’: Cartesian perspectivalism; the so- called art of describing, where 
the viewer is drawn to the surface or material qualities of objects and not their 
relational disposition in space; and, finally, Baroque or anamorphic modernity 
(Jay 1988).
5 Perhaps the most famous characterisation of the Hobbesian yes person is 
Macpherson’s ‘possessive individual’ (1962).
6 I think it is fair to say the exception here would be Kelty (2008), who encounters 
‘recursion’ as an ethnographic quality of how programmers construct their social 
and technological relations.
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